I. INTRODUCTION "Well, I don't want no Short People Don't want no Short People Don't want no Short People Round here." 1
At first blush, the concept of real height discrimination is almost laughable. After all, we do not typically think of height when we discuss types of discrimination.
2 Yet there is no denying that we place a high premium on height, gap by examining how existing federal antidiscrimination laws-namely Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990-do and do not protect against height-based prejudice in the workplace. Part II explores the pervasiveness of heightism generally and its specific impact on hiring, wages, and other aspects of employment. Part III looks at the various ways plaintiffs have pursued height-based claims under Title VII and suggests a new approach to such claims: characterizing heightism, in some cases, as a kind of impermissible gender stereotyping. Part IV considers height under the ADA-including the ADA Amendments Act of 2008-and contends that height outside the "normal range," as defined by this Article, qualifies as an "impairment"; Part IV also considers height-based claims under the ADA's "regarded as" prong. Finally, Part V briefly examines state and local remedies for height discrimination, including state common law and antidiscrimination laws, and considers whether Congress should enact a comprehensive height discrimination law flatly prohibiting height-based employment decisions. Part V concludes that, although a comprehensive prohibition would be easiest to administer, such a prohibition would prove both gratuitous and unwise. Rather, modest amendments to the federal regulations and increased state and local enforcement should suffice.
II. THE REALITIES OF HEIGHT DISCRIMINATION

A. Heightism, Generally
Heightism is instinctive. We cannot help making subconscious height-based comparisons. 10 We engage in "gaze behavior"-a primitive way of establishing social hierarchies on the basis of whether we are looking up to or down on another-whenever we encounter someone. 11 To those we look down on, we ascribe less social power and negative character traits. 12 We even afford short people less personal space. 13 Those we look up to, however, enjoy a "halo effect," 10 ("Both men and women, whether short or tall, thought that short men-heights between 5'2' and 5'5"-were less mature, less positive, less secure, less masculine; less successful, less capable, less confident, less outgoing; more inhibited, more timid, more passive; and so on."). 13 14 This is perhaps most evident in our selection of presidents. 15 We almost always elect the taller presidential candidate. 16 In fact, we have not elected a shorter-than-average president since 1896 17 and have elected scarcely a halfdozen short presidents overall. 18 Furthermore, a candidate's margin of victory derives, in part, from his height. 19 Heightism is also inculcated. Our language is rife with heightist idioms. 20 As children, we are constantly reminded of how much we have grown, and we are MOTOR SKILLS 223, 223-30 (1976) ). One study showed that we accord more than twice as much personal space to tall people than we do to short people. , 88 PSYCHOL. REPORTS 741, 741-42 (2001) . 20 Compare sayings that underscore the disadvantages of being short or small (short shrift; coming up short; short end of the stick; caught short; draw the short straw; short change; feel small) with those that highlight the virtues of being big or tall (look up to someone; big man on campus; head and shoulders above the rest; stand tall; be the bigger person; make it big). encouraged to "eat our vegetables" and "drink milk" so we can grow up to be "big and strong." 21 Even science has contributed to negative perceptions of short stature. In the early twentieth century, eugenists identified short stature as an inferior trait, 22 and scientists thereafter set out to fix the "problem." 23 In the 1950s, scientists began treating some slow-growing children with human growth hormone (HGH) extracted from the pituitary glands of cadavers, but such treatment was administered only to those with diagnosed medical deficiencies because of limited supply. 24 In the mid-1980s, however, the number of people receiving HGH treatment exploded with the advent of synthetic HGH, and included many who suffered from no diagnosable growth disorders. 25 Although much of the ensuing debate over HGH focused on whether shortness (as opposed to growth deficiency) constituted a disease in itself, 26 the underlying issue about which all seemed to agree was how bad it is to be short. 27 Proponents of greater availability of HGH focused on the fact that being short "handicaps a [person] in the competition for schools, jobs, income, and 'mates. '" 28 Ultimately, the wider availability of HGH 21 See MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 2, at 19; see also Short Guys Finish Last, supra note 12 ("As boys grow, the importance of height is drummed into them incessantly. 'My, how tall you are!' the relatives squeal with approval. Or, with scorn, 'Don't you want to grow up big and strong?'"). 22 Eugenist Charles Davenport investigated the inheritance of height. See Charles B. Davenport, Inheritance of Stature, 2 GENETICS 313, 315-17 (1917) . Davenport's peers, Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard, promoted the inferiority of certain ethnic groups because of their "dwarfish stature." See also ROBERT MICHAEL, A CONCISE HISTORY OF AMERICAN ANTISEMITISM 130 (2005) (noting that one scholar viewed Jews as having a "dwarfish stature"). Vernon Kellogg went so far as to criticize military conscription, on the eve of World War I, because drafts and war lessened the genetic stock of a nation; the derivative loss of tall, strong men to war diminished "the stature of the next generation." Vernon Kellogg, Eugenics and Militarism, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1913, at 105 . 23 One article published in a prominent pediatric journal described it as " [t] AMERICAN DREAM 241 (2003) . 27 See id. 28 Id. (citations omitted).
treatment made more people view short stature as a problem to be fixed. 29 Perhaps that explains why more and more short-but otherwise healthy-adults have turned to "limb lengthening" to combat the stigma of short stature.
30
Yet even though our instinctive and inculcated preference for height is pervasive, we do not generally acknowledge its existence. 31 There may be two reasons for this:
Either the awareness regarding discrimination is not in the consciousness of one or both individuals in a particular social situation, or verbalization of the discrimination is suppressed. The result is that the short [person] feels that something is subtly awry, but he cannot pin it down. He may believe that this discrimination is based on the social feedback that he does not look quite right, that he falls significantly short of the cultural ideal for height.
32
Strive as victims of height discrimination may, combating heightism is "like fighting a ghost." 33 29 Joel Frader, a doctor and ethicist in the Medical Humanities and Bioethics Program at Northwestern University, characterized the FDA's decision to approve expanded availability and use of HGH as "tragic" because it "medicalized short stature and turned it into an illness." HALL, supra note 5, at 245. 30 Limb lengthening is an expensive and painful procedure by which a surgeon "divides a long bone into two or more sections, separates the sections slightly and braces the bone and limb with metal 'scaffolding,'" then adjusts the pins and screws on this frame "to keep tension between the sections, enabling the bone to grow back together gradually into a complete but longer bone." MayoClinic. 31 See MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 2, at 38 ("Discrimination against short males, although often subtle, remains a powerful factor in their lives. . . . Society positively frames an identity for the short female by labeling her as 'cute' or 'dainty,' while the short boy is just plain short."). 32 Id. 33 Id. (quoting RALPH KEYES, THE HEIGHT OF YOUR LIFE 92 (1980) ). [NO. 3
B. The Impact of Heightism in Employment
No matter its source, the problem is prejudice. 34 Height-based prejudice permeates employment decisions-perhaps as much as race and gender. 35 It begins with hiring. For example, when researchers asked a group of recruiters to make a hypothetical hiring decision between two equally qualified candidates who differed only in height, 72 percent of the recruiters chose the taller candidate.
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Height also affects wages. Data suggest that every additional inch in height is associated with a 1.8 to 2.2 percent increase in wages 37 -or roughly $789 per inch, per year. 38 Moreover, the tallest 25 percent of the population gets a 13 percent boost in median income compared with the shortest 25 percent. 39 In socially oriented jobs such as sales and management, height was shown to be predictive of earnings. 40 Although some speculate that taller people earn more because of a correlation between height and intelligence, 41 studies controlling for intelligence continue to find a significant relationship between height and earnings. 42 Similarly controlling for gender, height continues to affect wages. 43 Height's effect does not decline over time; in fact, its importance may even increase as we age. 44 Finally, height affects professional advancement. Height impacts self-esteem (how individuals regard themselves) and social esteem (how individuals are regarded by others), which in turn affect actual job performance, perceived job performance, and, ultimately, professional success. 45 It is hardly a coincidence that 58 percent of Fortune 500 CEOs are six feet or taller (compared with roughly 14.5 percent of all men) and 30 percent are 6'2" or taller (compared with 3.9 percent of 34 Id. at 36 (quoting JOHN S. GILLIS, TOO TALL TOO SMALL 61 (1982)). 35 See Persico, supra note 16, at 1020-21. In fact, one economist has suggested that "[t]he gross mistake is that much of what we normally assume is sex discrimination is height discrimination. Of course, heightism affects both men and women, but because women average 4 to 5 inches shorter than men, it affects 44 See id. 45 See id.
all men). 46 One business expert has suggested that an additional four inches in height "make[s] much more difference in terms of success in a business career than any paper qualifications you have" and that it would be better to be "5 ft. 10 and a graduate of N.Y.U.'s business school than 5 ft. 6 and a Harvard Business School graduate." 47 Another commentator concluded that "being short is probably as much, or more, of a handicap to corporate success as being a woman or an African American." 48 In sum, heightism tangibly affects employment decisions involving short employees. Because this type of discrimination is subtle, however, many who fall prey to it may not realize, or even think to realize, that it motivated decisions against them. 49 58 This Part, however, examines only how height fits into the prima facie case as a matter of law. The post-prima facie case inquiry is incredibly fact sensitive 59 and therefore beyond the scope of this Article, which considers merely whether height-based claims are legally cognizable.
To that end, this Part has two subsections. The first subsection analyzes claims brought under what one might call the "traditional" approaches, which have involved challenges to (1) facially neutral height restrictions under a disparate impact theory; (2) the uneven application of height restrictions as a pretext under a disparate treatment theory; and (3) height-based animus that has some demonstrable nexus to a protected trait under a disparate treatment theory. The second subsection suggests a new approach to height-based claims: challenging height-based disparate treatment as a form of impermissible gender stereotyping. 55 For a disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must show: "(1) membership in a protected group; (2) qualification for the job in question; (3) 58 For example, the employer could show in a disparate treatment case that religion, sex, or national origin (but not race or color) is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006) . In disparate impact cases, the employer could show that the "challenged practice is job related for the position in question . . . consistent with business necessity," id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), and that "there are [no] other ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a protected class." Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) . 59 Cf. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03 ("We need not attempt in the instant case to detail every manner which fairly could be recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire.").
A. The "Traditional" Approaches
Height Restrictions Under a Disparate Impact Theory
As noted above, a disparate impact theory requires the plaintiff to point to a specific employment practice that adversely and disproportionately affects a protected group. 60 This most commonly arises when an employer implements some sort of minimum height restriction. Such restrictions tend to adversely impact women and certain racial and ethnic groups.
With respect to gender, in the seminal Dothard v. Rawlinson, 61 an Alabama statute required that prison guards stand at least 5'2" and weigh 120 pounds. 62 The Supreme Court found that the minimum height and weight restrictions violated Title VII because, when combined, they would exclude 41.13 percent of the female population while excluding less than 1 percent of the male population. 63 Conversely, in Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 64 a 6'7" white male plaintiff was rejected for employment as a truck driver because of the company's 6'4" maximum height limitation for the position. 65 Livingston alleged reverse sex discrimination under Title VII because the restriction had a disparate impact on males. 66 Statistical evidence showed that 0.9 percent of adult men were 6'4" or taller, whereas only 0.3 percent of women were 5'11" or taller; thus, the height maximum excluded three times as many men as women. 67 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit rejected the reverse discrimination claim because it determined that "in impact cases, as in disparate treatment cases, a member of a favored group [like men] must show background circumstances supporting the inference that a facially neutral policy with a disparate impact is in fact a vehicle for unlawful discrimination," which the plaintiff had failed to do.
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Plaintiffs also have challenged minimum height restrictions for their disparate impact on people of certain races and national origins-namely, Asians and 60 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 61 433 U.S. 321 (1977) . 62 Id. at 323-24. 63 Id. at 329-31; cf. 28 C.F.R. § 50.14, pt.1 § 4(D) (2008) ("A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact . . . .").
Another named plaintiff, a woman who applied for a position as a state trooper, successfully challenged the 5'9" height requirement and the 160-pound weight requirement for the position under the Equal Protection Clause. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 324 n.4. 64 82 a trucking company had instituted a 5'7" minimum height requirement for its drivers, which it strictly enforced against minority applicants; 83 the company selectively enforced the height restriction for white applicants who did not meet the minimum. 84 The court found that the selective application of the height restriction to minorities violated Title VII. 85 Similarly, in Schick v. Bronstein, 86 the male plaintiff applied for a position as a patrolman in the New York City Police Department but was rejected because he failed to meet the 5'7" minimum height requirement in effect when he applied.
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The police department also did not hire women as patrol officers when the plaintiff submitted his application. 88 Shortly after he was rejected, the police department began hiring women as patrol officers and dropped the height requirement for all applicants. 89 When the plaintiff reapplied for the job, however, the police department continued to apply the height restriction to him. 90 The court determined that the department's continued application of the height restriction to the plaintiff, when no such height requirement was applied to female applicants, "constituted a refusal of employment based on sex, in violation of Title VII."
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African American applicants and was not "used to facilitate a discriminatory attitude against" African Americans). 82 92 an airline did not hire women as flight attendants if they were taller than 5'9" but did hire men who were as tall as 6'0". 93 The court determined that the airline had violated Title VII by imposing a shorter maximum height requirement on women than it imposed on men. 
Height-Based Animus with a Demonstrable Nexus to a Protected Trait
Many Title VII suits have challenged height-based animus as a pretext for intentional discrimination on the basis of some protected trait. Most of these cases have failed, however, because the plaintiffs could not establish a nexus between the alleged height-based animus and a trait protected by the statute; that is, they failed to establish the requisite inference of discriminatory motive. In Ekerman v. City of Chicago, 95 for example, the plaintiff was a 4'10", ninety-two-pound female detective in the Chicago Police Department who brought a Title VII claim alleging gender discrimination. 96 She claimed that her work environment was unlawfully hostile because of a single, gender-neutral remark allegedly made by the deputy police chief, who "called out from behind her and said: 'Boy are you short. How tall are you? How can you do this job?'" 97 The district court granted summary judgment to the city, finding that Title VII did not generally prohibit height discrimination, that the statement was facially gender neutral, and that the plaintiff "offer[ed] no evidence to support a finding that the remark, despite being sexneutral on its face, was actually made on account of her gender." 100 He alleged that Walmart did not promote him on the basis of his age and race. 101 The district court dismissed his race discrimination claim for lack of supporting evidence 102 and found that, despite the fact that a regional vice president referred to him as "Shortez," the record did not support his bare allegations of endemic managerial 92 96 Id. at *2, *8. 97 Id. at *7. 98 Id. at *8. The court also dismissed the plaintiff's retaliation claim. Id. at *12-14. Although the plaintiff filed a report about the height-based comments, the court determined that filing such a report was not statutorily protected activity under Title VII because her subjective belief that the comments were motivated by sexual animus were unreasonable in the absence of proof of such animus. Id. at *10, *12. 99 104 reached a similar conclusion on comparable facts. 105 
B. A New Approach: Height as a Form of Gender Stereotyping
Although these traditional approaches have proven moderately successful, they continue to underachieve because they fail to capture one of the most significant components of height discrimination: gender stereotyping. As this subsection shows, many cases of height-based animus, especially animus directed toward short men and tall women, result from gender stereotyping.
The Theory
Height constitutes one of many significant factors that go into overall physical attractiveness, particularly for men, and "[i]t is almost axiomatic that short males are not attractive, or at least not as attractive as their taller counterparts." 106 After all, we often describe the quintessential man as "tall, dark, and handsome." 107 Relative height preoccupies men, and short men typically struggle to form a sense of physical adequacy and competency. 108 Women perceive short men as undesirable mates because they "do not strike [them] as true men." 109 Research plainly shows that "[t]he universally acknowledged cardinal rule of dating and mate selection is that the male will be significantly taller than his female partner" 110 and that "women are actively selecting for tallness when they go looking for male partners." More importantly, however, "large body size has a symbolic meaning to males that is unique to their gender."
112 Put simply, we (both males and females) view large men as more manly. 113 As such, short men struggle to negotiate and solidify positive male identity. 114 Because we value bigness in men-in part because much of the normative male gender role involves offering security to self and others, which we assume smaller men are less capable (or even incapable) of providing-shortness in males manifests a failure to satisfy the norm. 115 Conversely, because women are generally shorter than men and desire to be small, 116 a tall woman may be perceived as defying her gender norm because of her uncharacteristic stature. 117 Consider that endocrinologists in the 1950s prescribed hormones as growth suppressants for tall girls.
118 Data collected in 1978 showed that up to one half of pediatric endocrinologists had offered estrogen to young women whose adult height they forecast to be greater than 6'1". 119 More recent data suggest this practice is out of fashion, although one in five pediatric endocrinologists had reported treating at least one girl for "tall stature" within the past five years. 124 See id. at 235 ("[S]ome of the partners reacted negatively to Hopkins' personality because she was a woman. One partner described her as 'macho'; another suggested that she 'overcompensated for being a woman'; a third advised her to take 'a course at charm school.' Several partners criticized her use of profanity; in response, one partner suggested that those partners objected to her swearing only 'because it's a lady using foul language.' Another supporter explained that Hopkins 'ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady ptr candidate.'"). 125 Id. at 251. The Court further noted that "we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for 'in forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. ' 130 for example, the plaintiff applied for a position as a mailroom clerk with the defendant employer, but was not hired because the interviewing supervisor thought his behavior was "effeminate." 131 The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim because he failed to allege that he was discriminated against "because he was a male." 132 Instead, the plaintiff alleged discrimination because "as a male, he was thought to have those attributes more generally characteristic of females and epitomized in the descriptive 'effeminate'." 133 The court determined that, because Title VII did not forbid discrimination on sexual preference, it did not prohibit the conduct alleged. 134 The Ninth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in 142 Id. at 262-64. However, the Bibby plaintiff failed to prove this theory because "he did not claim that he was harassed because he failed to comply with societal stereotypes of how men ought to appear or behave." Id. at 264. 143 Id. at 263; see also Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding the district court's dismissal of a same-sex harassment claim where plaintiff's co-workers "repeatedly assaulted him with such comments as 'go fuck yourself, fag,' 'suck my dick,' and 'so you like it up the ass?'"); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (denying same-sex harassment claim on appeal because, despite evidence that co-workers mocked plaintiff's supposedly effeminate characteristics, plaintiff presented that evidence to the district court only as an example of discrimination Turning back to height, discrimination against a short man because he is short is, in effect, discrimination against him because his short stature manifests his failure to satisfy the male gender norm, i.e., because he is less manly than he ought to be. Likewise, discrimination against a tall woman because of her tall stature can be premised on an impermissible gender stereotype. Such discrimination would arguably fall within the contours of Title VII's prohibition against gender-based discrimination.
The Approach
Although pervasive, height discrimination in the workplace is often latent, manifesting predominantly either in failures to hire or promote, or in disparate wages. As a result, the "traditional" approaches tend to break down: the disparate impact claim approach underachieves because, in many cases, employers will not have an express policy of height discrimination in hiring, promotion, or wages; and, the individual disparate treatment approach typically fails because discrete instances of height-based animus have proved hard to connect to a protected trait.
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There remains a third theory, however, that combines elements of both the individual disparate treatment and disparate impact theories and which responds nicely to the frailties of both theories in the context of height discriminationnamely, a systemic disparate treatment (or "pattern or practice") theory. A systemic disparate treatment theory still requires a showing of discriminatory intent in order to succeed, 145 but it permits an inference of such intent from a pattern of adverse outcomes or "bad stats."
146 Plaintiffs can prevail under such a theory if they can "prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory acts"-that is, that discrimination was the employer's "standard operating procedure."
147 Put into context, a height discrimination plaintiff could establish impermissible gender stereotyping predicated on height by showing a pattern of adverse employment actions that disproportionately affect a protected group. 148 For example, while a short man might struggle to connect his because of sexual orientation); Doe v. 153 for example, the class alleged that Wal-Mart discriminated against female employees by delegating unfettered decision-making authority to lower-level supervisors and managers, which resulted in lower wages and fewer or slower promotions for female workers. 154 To support their claim, the Dukes plaintiffs presented evidence, both anecdotal and expert, that Wal-Mart corporate culture placed a strong emphasis on building and maintaining a uniform culture and fostered an environment that perpetuated gender stereotyping.
155 Similar class lawsuits have challenged the delegation of unfettered decision-making authority that promotes stereotypes and, in turn, limits opportunities for women or minorities.
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Although a systemic theory of liability (either disparate impact or systemic disparate treatment) seems best suited for height-based claims, plaintiffs proceeding under a systemic disparate treatment theory are more likely to succeed if they can supplement their statistical evidence with direct evidence of when considered in isolation, may actually produce gender bias when connected to broader exclusionary patterns."). 149 Height-based discrimination claims may also prove viable under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 159 The ADA generally prohibits discrimination "because of" one's disability. 160 Just like Title VII plaintiffs, an ADA plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case under either a disparate treatment theory or a disparate impact theory. 161 Under either theory, however, the first and typically fatal hurdle has been establishing one's "disability." 163 This section examines how short stature fits (or does not fit) within each of these definitions. The first part looks at height-based claims under an "actual impairment" theory. Although most courts have wholly rejected "actual impairment" claims premised on short stature, a fresh look at the regulatory scheme in light of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA") suggests that such claims may have merit after all. The second part considers height-based claims under the "regarded as" prong. Although "regarded as" claims premised on height have largely failed, such claims may prove increasingly viable after the enactment of the ADAAA.
A. "Actual Impairment"
Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To be protected under the ADA's "actual impairment" prong, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he or she suffers from a physical or mental impairment (2) that substantially limits a major life activity. 164 The 168 A plain reading of this language would suggest that the definition of "physical impairment" includes either (1) a normal deviation in height that is the product of a physiological disorder, or (2) an extreme deviation in height that may or may not be caused by a physiological disorder. Many federal courts have not read the regulations this expansively, finding that short stature does not constitute an impairment and, thus, is not protected under the ADA. As this part demonstrates, however, these courts have too narrowly construed the statute and regulations, particularly in light of the ADAAA's renewed commitment to expanding protections against disability discrimination. Extreme deviations in height may qualify as impairments and, in some cases, rise to the level of disability even in the absence of an underlying physiological disorder.
Extreme Short Stature Constitutes an Impairment (a) "Just Plain Short"
As noted above, a plain reading of the EEOC's interpretive guidance suggests that height can qualify as an impairment in one of two ways: (1) if a physiological disorder causes a normal deviation in height; or (2) if one suffers from an extreme deviation in height (i.e., outside the "normal range"), whether or not it is the result of a physiological disorder. 170 This section focuses on the second possible reading because most cases of short stature are not the result of a physiological disorder.
Short stature has myriad causes. Some causes are environmental, such as trauma, radiation, and malnutrition.
171 Some causes are medical, including growth hormone deficiency (e.g., hypopituitary dwarfism), 172 congenital diseases (e.g., Turner syndrome), 173 illness (e.g., chronic renal insufficiency), 174 and skeletal dysplasias (e.g., achondroplasia and diastrophic displasia). 175 However, medical causes account for only about 5 percent of short stature cases, 176 which is to say that most short people suffer from no biological malfunction at all. 177 are not impairments. . . . At extremes, however, such deviations may constitute impairments." (internal citations omitted)). 170 1994) ); see also MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 2, at 1 ("More than half of very short individuals have no apparent endocrinological or biological abnormality.").
The remaining short people comprise a "heterogeneous group of otherwise apparently normal [people] who are at or below the 5th percentile for height" but who respond normally to growth hormone. 178 This group includes those classified as having genetic short stature, normal-variant familial short stature (if they have short parents), constitutional delay of growth (if they experience a delay in skeletal maturation), or idiopathic short stature (in the absence of any other diagnosable cause). 179 Courts have already recognized that short stature resulting from a variety of the aforementioned medical causes, notably achondroplasia and diastrophic dysplasia, qualifies as an impairment. 180 Those who are just plain short, however, have had virtually no success bringing pure height-based claims under the "actual impairment" prong.
In 185 the plaintiff was a 6'5", wheelchairconfined inmate who sued under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because he was not provided with a bed that suitably accommodated his height and disability. 186 The plaintiff conceded that the inadequacy of the bed derived primarily from his height, which caused his feet to dangle over the edge of the bed. 187 The district court rejected his ADA claim, declaring that "a person's height is not ordinarily an 'impairment' covered as a disability by the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA" and finding that physical characteristics, such as height, that are not the result of a physiological disorder do not qualify as impairments. 194 The second example, which the EEOC finds does qualify under the ADA, involves a 4'5" man suffering from achondroplastic dwarfism. 195 Unfortunately, neither of these examples actually clarifies what falls outside "normal range."
(i) Why the EEOC's Interpretive Examples Provide No Guidance
The second of the EEOC's examples is entirely inapposite to cases that do not involve medically-caused short stature because the plaintiff in that example clearly suffers from an underlying physiological disorder. 196 Thus, the plaintiff in the example would qualify for protection even under the more limited reading of the regulation that many courts have applied to height-based cases. The first example, moreover, although superficially helpful, is deficient for two reasons: (1) it speaks in terms of nominal height rather than relative height (i.e., in inches, not percentiles), which is most appropriate when discussing the "normal range"; and (2) In American Motors, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered under the state's Fair Employment Act the discrimination claims of a 4'10"-tall woman who had been denied a job as a factory worker allegedly because of her short stature. imposes limitations on a person's ability to achieve and capacity to work beyond the normal limitations that might render a person unable to make certain achievements or perform every possible job."
203 Although the court determined that "[a]ll persons have some mental or physical deviations from the norm," the court rightly held that "such inherent limitations or deviations . . . do not automatically constitute handicaps." 204 The court concluded, however, that the plaintiff's height "[did] not constitute such a significant deviation from the norm that it [made] achievement unusually difficult" because-although the plaintiff was below the norm for height and faced "some limitations on her general ability to achieve and work, a person with her stature [remained] capable of a wide range of achievements, including many that a taller and heavier person could not do." 205 The EEOC's continued reliance on American Motors for guidance is problematic for several reasons. First, the decision deals exclusively with Wisconsin state law. Moreover, the case was decided over a decade after the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which internally defined "disability," as does the ADA, as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities."
206 Thus, it is significant that Wisconsin's Fair Employment Act defined handicap and impairment differently from then-existing federal law because it suggests that the Wisconsin law was meant to apply independently of the federal law and its definitions. 207 Second, the American Motors court never discretely considered whether the plaintiff's height was itself an impairment. 208 Rather, the court approached the inquiry such that, in effect, it conflated the factual determination of whether the plaintiff was impaired with the legal determination of whether she was "handicapped" (and thus eligible for protection under the Act). The Wisconsin 203 Id. 204 Id. at 124. 205 Id. . 208 See Miller, supra note 9, at 247 (observing that the plaintiff's lawyers "stressed her ability to perform the job's tasks, down-playing any evidence of physical impairment," a strategy that "excluded arguments which addressed the classification of stature as a handicap").
courts now bifurcate this analysis to parallel the ADA analysis, considering first whether a person has an impairment and then determining whether that impairment makes "achievement unusually difficult or limits the capacity to work." 209 Finally, American Motors relied on the Fair Employment Act's definition of disability-limited in its application exclusively to the employment contextwhich rendered impairments protected only if they "impose[d] limitations on a person's ability to achieve and capacity to work beyond the normal limitations that might render a person unable to make certain achievements or perform every possible job." 210 The ADA, however, considers whether an impairment "substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities," 211 which encompasses far more than just working. 212 After all, the ADA extends well beyond the employment context. 213 Thus, the determination by the American Motors court that the plaintiff was not disabled because she could still work would not presently preclude a finding that a 4'10"-tall woman is "disabled" under the ADA if her impairment substantially limited a life activity other than working. The ADAAA has since codified a non-exhaustive list of such life activities. 214 In sum, although the EEOC has tried to clarify what constitutes outside the "normal range" for height, its purported guidance provides little guidance at all. In the absence of such agency insight, the question remains how to determine when a person's short stature is sufficiently extreme to qualify as an impairment under the federal statute.
(ii) What Should Be Considered "Within Normal Range"
To determine what is within normal range for height, one might look for guidance to similar regulations governing weight. However, the weight-based regulations prove largely unhelpful for a variety of reasons, most notably that few if any pure weight-based discrimination claims are brought under the ADA. 215 their obesity. 216 To qualify as an impairment, a person's weight must actually constitute "severe" or "morbid" obesity, i.e., it must be 100 percent over that person's medically ideal weight. 217 This measurement, however, is relative to a nominal value (normal height for one's ideal weight), without reference to the frequency with which that value occurs in the population. And what constitutes normal or abnormal weight depends on not just how heavy one is, but how heavy one is compared with how tall one is. 218 To put it simply, there theoretically could be an unlimited number of obese people if everyone weighed twice as much as he or she should, 219 while there could never be an unlimited number of short people because some will always be taller or shorter than others. 220 Thus, because mere weight as a characteristic is not protected under the ADA, and because obesity is not truly examined for statistical "normalcy" within the population, the definition of obesity does little to inform the determination of "normal range" for height.
The most logical remaining option for determining "normal range" would be to look to statistical principles, namely standard deviation. 221 Standard deviation, as a "descriptive statistic,"
222 measures "the typical or expected variation of the numbers in a group from their average." 223 Standard deviation is particularly useful when examining a "normal population" of numbers, 224 like anthropometric data (height, weight, etc.), 225 which resemble bell-shaped curves. 226 Looking at the "range" of a normal population, i.e., from the lowest value to the highest value, 68 percent of all values will fall within one standard deviation of the mean: 34 percent will be within one standard deviation below the mean, and 34 percent will be within one standard deviation above the mean. 227 Roughly 96 percent of all values will fall within two standard deviations from the mean, 48 percent below and 48 percent above. 228 Thus, only 4 percent of the population will fall beyond two standard deviations from the mean-the smallest and largest 2 percent of values relative to the mean. 229 One can use standard deviation to test the degree to which an assumption, called a null hypothesis, is the result of chance. 230 An outcome is not likely to be the result of chance if it falls more than two standard deviations from the mean, because there are only four chances in 100 that the outcome is consistent with the assumption. 231 Thus, if the assumption is that a person's height will be average, anyone whose height falls beyond two standard deviations from the average-that is, anyone among the shortest 2 percent or the tallest 2 percent-is not of average (normal) height. Generally, statisticians reject the null hypothesis when there is less than a 5 percent probability that the outcome is the product of chance. 232 This means that any outcome falling beyond 1.96 standard deviations above or below the mean is excluded. 233 Applying these principles, the shortest 2.5 percent and the tallest 2.5 percent of the population statistically fall outside "normal range" for height. Based on national anthropometric data collected by the National Center for Health Statistics, men shorter than approximately 5'4" and women shorter than roughly 4'11" would fall outside normal range.
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A 2.5 percentile benchmark ostensibly comports with other regulatory and scientific benchmarks for abnormal height. For example, the FDA recommends treating idiopathic short stature in children only in cases where the child's growth rate is unlikely to produce an adult height within normal range, which the FDA 223 Id. at 129. 224 Id. at 140. 225 See infra app. tbls.1-4. 226 BARNES & CONLEY, supra note 222, at 140. 227 ZIMMER, supra note 149, at 242. 228 See id. 229 Id; see also infra app. fig.1 . 230 See ZIMMER, supra note 149, at 237. 231 Id. at 243. 232 Id. 233 Id. 234 This is yet another reason why the EEOC's interpretive example, based on the facts of American Motors, proves unhelpful. In American Motors, the plaintiff was a 4'10" female. See supra notes 193-194 and accompanying text.
projects to be sixty-three inches for men and fifty-nine inches for women. 235 Both the American Academy of Pediatrics and American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists define short stature in a similar manner. 236 They state that short stature is "height that falls more than two standard deviations . . . below the national mean for age and sex." 237 In the context of disability benefits provided under the Social Security Act, persistent height below the third percentile that is also "related to an additional specific medically determinable impairment" qualifies as a compensable disability in children.
238 Short adults, however, do not qualify for Social Security benefits, 239 although the qualifying standards for "disability" under the Social Security Administration tend to be more rigorous than those for protection under the ADA. 240 Nevertheless, the 2.5 percentile is frustratingly subjective. Although some doctors consider height below even the fifth percentile to be outside normal range, 241 ) (finding no qualifying growth impairment, despite persistence of height below third percentile, absent evidence that established its relation to another impairment). 239 The Social Security Administration determines eligibility for disability benefits on the basis of regulations that describe "various physical and mental illnesses and abnormalities, most of which are categorized by the body system they affect." Sullivan v. Zebley, S.S.R. No. 91-7c (Cum. Ed. 1991), 1991 SSR LEXIS 7, at *12 (Aug. 1, 1991) (citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. I (pt. A)). In addition to those categorized body systems-"musculoskeletal, special senses and speech, respiratory, cardiovascular, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine"-there are four additional groups of listings not categorized by body system, which include multiple body system impairments, neurological impairments, mental disorders, and malignant neoplastic diseases. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 n.6 (1990). For children, however, the regulations add a category for "growth impairment." Id.
240 Cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 797-98 (1999) (observing that "[t]he Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program provides benefits to a person with a disability so severe that she is 'unable to do [her] previous work' and 'cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy [,] '" whereas the ADA considers merely whether "'with reasonable accommodation' she could 'perform the essential functions' of her job" (citing 42 U.S.C. § § 1382c(a)(3), 12111(8)). 241 See HALL, supra note 5, at 303; Sandberg & Colsman, supra note 12, at 18.
example, some researchers suggest that a boy who is just one standard deviation below the average height for his age remains at risk for "psychological difficulties." 243 Ultimately, the problems associated with short stature may not boil down to height at all but rather a person's "ability to cope with the stresses of being short." 
"Substantially Limits a Major Life Activity"
The second hurdle to establishing a viable "actual impairment" claim involves showing how one's impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Several courts have dismissed height-based claims, before the ADAAA, because the plaintiff failed to establish this element. For example, in Reiterman v. Costco Wholesale Management # 238, 245 the 4'8" female plaintiff claimed that she was disabled because her short stature made it difficult to reach her cash register and that constant reaching caused her tendinitis. 246 The court rejected her ADA claim, perfunctorily finding that her height was not a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA "because it [did] not 'substantially limit' her ability to engage in the major life activity of working." 247 Likewise, in Mullet v. American Cargo, Inc., 248 the district court determined that the plaintiff could not proceed under an "actual impairment" theory because he could not identify any major life activity that his height kept him from performing. 249 The ADAAA now codifies in the statute a non-exhaustive list of qualifying life activities, which includes "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working." 250 The ADAAA further clarifies that a qualifying impairment need only substantially limit one such activity in order to render someone "disabled." 251 Concededly, being just plain short in most cases does not substantially limit one's ability to engage in any of the aforementioned life activities, at least under the pre-ADAAA definition of "substantially limits" (i.e., "prevents or severely restricts"). 252 To argue otherwise would be disingenuous. Nevertheless, there may very well be some whose height falls so far below the 2.5 percentile threshold (e.g., at the 1st percentile) that their short stature does limit a qualifying life activity; 253 but that proportion of people is small. As such, only a very limited group of individuals could likely successfully pursue an "actual impairment" claim applying the pre-ADAAA definition of "substantially limits."
Yet all may not be lost in the post-ADAAA world. First, the statutory list of qualifying major life activities is non-exhaustive and may be interpreted in the future to include activities that short stature does substantially limit. Second, Congress has directed that the definition of disability be construed broadly 254 and that impairments be considered in their unmitigated state-that is, before they are corrected by medication, assistive technology, accommodations, or modifications. 255 Third, in keeping with the spirit of the Findings and Purposes sections of the ADAAA, the EEOC may in the future retool its definition of "substantially limits" to be less restrictive than the pre-ADAAA standard. 256 Finally, it is important to understand that presently identifying short stature as an impairment may prove necessary to overcoming those pre-ADAAA cases that casually concluded that height can never qualify for protection under the ADA. 257 This body of law could hinder height-based claims brought, not only under the "actual impairment" prong, but also the "regarded as" prong. 258 
B. "Regarded As" Impaired
Whatever the merits of characterizing height as a disability, there can be no doubt that we perceive extreme short stature as a handicap. 259 It may be fair to say that discrimination against short people is more the result of stereotypes than any physical limitations imposed by their short stature. 260 As noted earlier, we often engage in "gaze behavior"-that is, we subconsciously relegate to a lesser social status those who are shorter than we are because we perceive them as physically inferior. 261 This perception is most evident in, and perhaps has been amplified by, the debate over the use of HGH to treat normal, short children.
262
Before the ADAAA, however, merely viewing an extremely short person as socially inferior would not have sufficed to render him or her protected. Pre-ADAAA, a person was covered by the "regarded as" prong of the ADA if (1) a covered entity treated a physical or mental impairment as though it substantially limited a major life activity, even though the impairment did not; (2) a covered impairment substantially limited a major life activity only as a result of the attitude of others toward such impairment; or (3) a covered entity treated a person as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity even though a person suffered from no such impairment. 263 The first two variations required a plaintiff to establish a qualifying impairment, while all three variations required that an impairment, be it real or perceived, either substantially limit a major life activity or be perceived by the employer to substantially limit such activity. 264 Thus, as alluded to above, a pre-ADAAA claim premised on height suffered from two major deficiencies: (1) qualifying short stature as an actual impairment, particularly given the arbitrariness of the 2.5 percentile threshold for impairment; 265 and (2) establishing how one's short stature substantially limited, or was perceived by the employer to substantially limit, a major life activity.
266
Under the more permissive ADAAA, however, a person is protected under the "regarded as" prong if an employer merely discriminates against him or her "because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity."
267 As such, the focus under the ADAAA dramatically shifts from the severity of the employer's 260 Cf. ADELSON, supra note 172, at 2-3 (discussing stereotypes related to dwarfism). 261 See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 262 See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text. Parents of otherwise healthy short children have pushed the medical community to treat their children with HGH because they fear the psychosocially disabling effects of short stature. See ELLIOTT, supra note 26, at 241; see also HALL, supra note 5, at 247 (noting that "many children who are severely short have nothing obviously wrong with them medically"); Vance & Mauras, supra note 172, at 1213 (noting that "[p]arental pressure to correct the perceived 'deficiency' of short stature has been responsible in part for the initiation of [growth hormone] treatment" among idiopathically short children). 263 misperception about an employee's impairment to merely whether an employee's actual or perceived impairment motivated an adverse employment action. 268 However, the amended "regarded as" prong does not apply to impairments that are both "minor" and "transitory" (i.e., those having "an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less"). 269 Moreover, covered employers "need not provide a reasonable accommodation or a reasonable modification to policies, practices, or procedures to an individual" who is disabled solely under the "regarded as" prong.
270
The ADAAA thus resolves the two major deficiencies suffered by "regarded as" claims premised on height. First, it renders unimportant whether a person's height is at or below the 2.5 percentile, so long as the employer regards a person's short stature as an impairment. For example, a person at the 2.6 percentile for height-who would not otherwise suffer from a qualifying impairment 271 -could still bring a "regarded as" claim if the employer unfairly perceived him or her as incapable because of his or her short stature. Second, it does away with the need to establish a causal nexus between one's short stature and substantial limits on a major life activity. Finally, although the ADAAA removes the employer's obligation to provide reasonable accommodations from the quiver of remedies available to "regarded as" plaintiffs, height discrimination typically manifests in a failure to hire, a failure to promote, or disparate wages, none of which ostensibly requires accommodations to remedy. (2008) (excluding from the protections of the "regarded as" prong "impairments that are transitory and minor") (emphasis added). Thus, even though short stature may be considered a minor impairment, it arguably qualifies under the "regarded as" prong because it is not transitory. 270 In sum, because common law tort claims involving height discrimination are held to a far more rigorous standard than such claims would be held to under federal antidiscrimination laws, state tort laws do not provide much protection in run-of-the-mill cases of workplace height discrimination.
State and Local Antidiscrimination Laws
In the absence of a federal law explicitly prohibiting height discrimination, and in light of the inadequacies of state tort law, several state and local governments have endeavored to fill the gaps in protection by promulgating statutory protections against height discrimination. One state, Michigan, affirmatively proscribes discrimination on the basis of height, 283 while another, Massachusetts, has actively considered protecting against height discrimination but has not yet passed such legislation. 284 The District of Columbia has taken a more general approach, condemning employment discrimination on the basis of "personal appearance," which includes "bodily . . . characteristics" such as height. 285 And several municipal governments in California-including those in San Francisco and Santa Cruz-have directly taken on height discrimination in the workplace. 286 Nevertheless, even in jurisdictions where laws explicitly prohibit height discrimination, few pure height discrimination cases have been brought, 287 and even fewer have been successful. 288 Part of the problem may be, as mentioned above, that height discrimination tends to be implicit, rarely manifesting in overtly discriminatory conduct. Thus, victims of height discrimination either may not realize they are being discriminated against or may not be able to amass sufficient evidence of discriminatory motive. Another part of the problem may be that some misapprehend what these laws actually protect against. For example, given that Michigan's law was passed almost contemporaneously with the Supreme Court's decision in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 289 -which held that an Alabama statute that imposed minimum height and weight requirements on prison guards violated Title VII because it disqualified over 40 percent of female applicants but less than 1 percent of male applicants 290 -some might mistake that law's solicitude of height as just another (i.e., less onerous) way to allege a gender-based disparate impact claim.
291 And yet another part of the problem might be that these jurisdictions have instituted protections against height discrimination merely to put themselves in the "vanguard of anti-discrimination," without any genuine or practical concern for height-based discrimination in the workplace. ) (finding no direct evidence of discrimination where the plaintiff testified that she thought she was too short for the job to which she was assigned while admitting that management personnel told her they thought she could do the job); Berry v 
B. Why a Federal Prohibition on Height Discrimination Is Unnecessary
As discussed above, gender-and disability-based theories under existing federal law provide protection against many cases of height discrimination-but neither theory is perfect. The gender-based theory would substantially protect short men and tall women, leaving short women, tall men, and all people of average height with no protection. A disability-based theory would only protect people whose height falls outside the "normal range" and those whose short stature an employer perceives as an impairment, but would not protect the vast majority of people.
Nevertheless, these two theories do capture the two most significant prejudices underlying height discrimination. The question remains, what should be done, if anything, about height-based employment decisions involving everyone else? A flat federal prohibition on height-based employment decisions first comes to mind.
Such a Prohibition Would Be Overinclusive
Although height is an immutable trait-and despite the fact that antidiscrimination laws are premised, at least in part, on the notion that arbitrary decisions based on immutable traits are unfair and immoral 293 -not all heightbased employment decisions are motivated by prejudice. Thus, a flat federal prohibition on height-based employment decisions, while being the easiest to administer, would be overinclusive. After all, an employer is generally free to prefer certain traits to others so long as that preference does not rise to the level of impermissible prejudice. 294 Still, some federal antidiscrimination laws, such as Title VII, overinclude by prohibiting trait-based employment decisions that may not actually be motivated by prejudice. 295 That is, Title VII prohibits the consideration of covered traits in all their variations and renders everyone a member of the protected class: its protections extend not only to minorities who are most likely to be victims of the City Council wanted to be in the vanguard of anti-discrimination, but that there was not an event or anything that occurred that they were responding to [in passing the law]."); Kubilis, supra note 284, at 225 (quoting the Michigan's Ombudsman as saying that "[t]here wasn't even much debate about [passing the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act]" and that the law passed with ease). 293 See ZIMMER, supra note 149, at 31. 294 See id.; see also Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999) ("By its terms, the ADA allows employers to prefer some physical attributes over others and to establish physical criteria."). 295 Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) ("The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one." (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 334 (1966))).
prejudice, but to everyone. Thus, Congress has implicitly determined that the price of overinclusion is justified because the distinction between invidious prejudice and benign preference as to Title VII's covered traits may be too subtle to be trusted.
Conversely, some federal antidiscrimination laws, like the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 296 and the ADA, are carefully circumscribed to prohibit consideration of specified traits only in limited cases, protecting only certain subgroups of people sharing a common trait. For example, although everyone has an "age," the ADEA only prohibits an employer from considering the age of those who are at least 40 years old because, according to Congress, such older employees are most likely to be victims of prejudice. 297 As such, younger employees are not protected even though they share the common trait of "age" with protected employees. Similarly, although millions of people may be classified as "impaired," protections under the ADA extend only to employees whose impairments rise to the level of a disability; those who merely have impairments that do not qualify as disabilities are not protected, even though they share the common trait of "impairment" with those covered by the statute. 298 Thus, Congress has implicitly determined that the price of overinclusion as to these traits is not justified because the prejudice-preference distinction can be clearly drawn with respect to these traits.
Overinclusion Would Not Be Justified
So how does one determine whether the price of overinclusion is justified? A useful shortcut may be the Equal Protection Clause itself. Classifications based on certain traits receive heightened scrutiny under the clause. 299 These include all of those traits covered by Title VII: race, religion, national origin, color, and gender. 300 Under heightened scrutiny, classifications based on these traits are presumptively invalid. 301 However, classifications based on traits such as age and 296 29 U.S.C. § § 621-34 (2006). 297 See id. § 621(a)(1) ("The Congress hereby finds and declares that . . . in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs."). 298 See supra Part IV.A. 299 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 539-42 (3d ed. 2006). 300 See generally id. at 541-42, 671(describing strict scrutiny). 301 See id. at 541-42 (observing that the proponent of the law, i.e., the government, bears the burden of proving the validity of the law under intermediate and strict scrutiny review); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("The general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin. These factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. disability receive mere rational basis review and are presumptively valid; 302 they need only be rational to survive. 303 Put simply, the level of overinclusiveness tolerated of a federal antidiscrimination law ostensibly coincides with the review given to the traits covered by that law under the Equal Protection Clause.
This brings us full circle. Whether the costs of a flat prohibition on heightbased employment decisions would be justified, despite its overinclusiveness, depends on the level of scrutiny a court would apply to height under the Equal Protection Clause. Based on precedential and pragmatic considerations, however, height need not receive heightened review, and, thus, any law prohibiting height discrimination could not broadly prohibit all height-based considerations in employment.
When deciding whether to apply heightened scrutiny to a given classification, the Supreme Court has generally favored (1) immutable characteristics, (2) groups traditionally unable to protect themselves through the political process, and (3) groups with a history of being discriminated against. 304 Although height is surely immutable, as an abstract trait it does not constitute a "discrete and insular minorit[y]," 305 and thus generally fails to satisfy the second and third factors.
306
From a practical standpoint, moreover, the Supreme Court has not seen fit within the past 30 years to broaden the categories of classifications receiving heightened scrutiny. 307 The Court's decision in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 308 succinctly captures the essence of the Court's reluctance. When faced with the plaintiffs' request to treat mental retardation as a quasi-suspect classification entitled to heightened scrutiny, the Court declined, observing that For these reasons, and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny, and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest."). 302 See generally Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 582 U.S. 62, 83-84 (2000) (discussing discrimination based on age); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (discussing discrimination based on disability). 303 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 299, at 540 (noting that, under rational basis review, the opponent of the law has the burden of proving its invalidity). 304 See id. at 672-73. 305 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."). 306 However, it may very well be that short people lack political power commensurate with their numbers among the general population. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (observing the paucity of short presidents); cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 299, at 672 ("Women, for example, are more than half the population, but traditionally they have been severely underrepresented in political offices."). 307 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 299, at 672. 308 473 U.S. 432 (1985) .
[i]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect . . . it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who perhaps have immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do so. Doubtless, there have been and there will continue to be instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in fact invidious, and that are properly subject to judicial correction under constitutional norms. But the appropriate method of reaching such instances is not to create a new quasi-suspect classification and subject all governmental action based on that classification to more searching evaluation. Rather, we should look to the likelihood that governmental action premised on a particular classification is valid as a general matter, not merely to the specifics of the case before us.
309
Put simply, height-based classifications would and should only receive rational basis review. 310 To be sure, there may be circumstances where the government invidiously classifies on the basis of height (as it has with disability); but, such classifications are likely to fail even under the least rigorous rational basis review.
311
Because height-based classifications would receive rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, any federal law prohibiting height-based employment decisions would have to be narrowly drawn to address only those employment decisions motivated by a height-based prejudice. Such a narrowly drawn prohibition would necessarily cover short people of all genders, and tall women. However, these groups are already protected, albeit somewhat crudely, 309 Id. at 445-46 (emphasis added). The Court went on to note that "mental retardation is a characteristic that the government may legitimately take into account in a wide range of decisions, and . . . we will not presume that any given legislative action, even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate." Id. at 446. Ultimately, the Court invalidated the classifications as lacking a rational relation to a legitimate government purpose. . 311 See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 447-50; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (finding unconstitutional Colorado's Amendment 2-which effectively prohibited the passing of antidiscrimination laws protecting homosexuals-because "its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests"). under existing federal laws: short men under the ADA and Title VII; short women under the ADA; and tall women under Title VII. 312 As such, any new federal law prohibiting height-based employment decisions would be redundant. Moreover, passing such a sweeping law would be practically and politically problematic, given increasing aversion to the expansion of antidiscrimination laws. 313 
C. A Proposal
Although a federal bar on height-based employment decisions would be gratuitous, modest changes to the regulations and interpretive guidance covering Title VII and the ADA would help to clarify the scope and contours of those laws' protections with respect to height. A change in the regulations, moreover, is preferable to a change in the statutes themselves because the federal rulemaking process is less political and more flexible than the legislative process. 314 For example, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(h) states that "'impairment' does not include physical characteristics such as . . . height, weight or muscle tone that are within 'normal' range and are not the result of a physiological disorder." As noted above, however, most courts have read this to mean that height cannot constitute an impairment on its own if not caused by a physiological disorder. 315 Although the EEOC has not adopted such a narrow view in its Interpretive Manual, 316 the regulation itself could be rephrased to make the disjunctive nature of the exclusion more evident. Thus, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(h) could be amended to read that "'impairment' does not include physical characteristics such as . . . height . . . that are either within 'normal' range or are not the result of a physiological disorder." Such a simple change to the regulation would counteract the bulk of pre-ADAAA cases that wrongly read the regulations to prohibit claims premised on height, and would permit height-based claims to proceed beyond motions to dismiss, where so many discrimination plaintiffs lose now that the Supreme Court has made federal pleading requirements more rigorous.
In addition, state and local governments should consider extending protections against height-based prejudice in the workplace, even if such protections have not been widely invoked by plaintiffs in those jurisdictions that have enacted such protections. 318 Jurisdictions that decide to pass such laws should consider explicitly but conservatively expanding protections beyond those offered by the federal laws. For example, a state law typifying an extreme deviation in height as an impairment might do well to broaden the definition to height at or below the third percentile, ensuring that victims at the margin of the clinical definition of profound short stature are not left unprotected.
Of course, jurisdictions could also adopt sweeping protections against heightbased employment decisions, such as those enacted in Michigan and the District of Columbia, if they determine that such protections are worth their commensurate costs. After all, the availability of state and local prohibitions may actually decrease litigation by increasing the frequency of mediation and negotiation. 319 Moreover, having access to multiple court systems would help to more evenly distribute the burden of resolving height-based discrimination claims (if such claims become fashionable). Ultimately, a victim of height discrimination should have at his or her disposal a full panoply of remedies, both federal and other, when he or she decides to challenge heightism that has adversely affected him or her at work.
VI. CONCLUSION
Heightism does exist, and its effects in the employment context are undeniable, even if its causes are less obvious. Many victims of height discrimination have tried in earnest to challenge the adverse treatment they faced because of their stature, and many have failed. Nevertheless, discrimination claims premised on height remain viable under both Title VII and the ADA.
partially granted, compared with 75 percent prior to Twombly); Nathan Koppel, Job Discrimination Cases Tend to Fare Poorly in Federal Court, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A16 (observing that "federal judges also now routinely terminate employmentdiscrimination cases through motions to dismiss, meaning that the plaintiffs aren't allowed to conduct fact finding to support their claims"). In Twombly, the Supreme Court raised the pleading standard that applies to federal complaints, now requiring that "[f]actual allegations . . . be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." 550 U.S. at 555. Subsequently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), the Supreme Court clarified the scope of its decision in Twombly, stating that "Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions" and holding that Rule 8 is satisfied only "where the well-pleaded facts . . . permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct . . . ." 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (emphasis added). 318 See supra notes 287-292 and accompanying text. 319 Cf. Kubilis, supra note 284, at 232-33 (describing the salutary effects caused by the Michigan, Santa Cruz, and San Francisco laws).
Discrimination against short men and tall women because of their height may constitute discrimination on the basis of a gender stereotype; employment decisions motivated by such stereotypes are unlawful. Discrimination against the profoundly short (i.e., those at or below the 2.5 percentile) because of their stature is likewise impermissible. Recent changes to the ADA, coupled with a fresh look at the regulatory scheme, suggests pre-ADAAA cases were wrong in summarily concluding that height-based discrimination is not actionable under the ADA.
In the end, federal law should prohibit height-based employment decisions motivated by prejudice, but a comprehensive law would be unfeasible. The fact is that existing federal law already prohibits the vast majority of cases involving such prejudice, and the costs of expanding federal law to ban all height-based employment decisions outweigh the benefits of such expansion. Nevertheless, modest amendments to the federal regulations-as well as the passing of protections against height discrimination by state and local governments-would go a long way in preventing this form of invidious prejudice. 
